

ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY OF UAE

Kholov Sukhrob Sobirovich

*Jahon Iqtisodiyoti va Diplomatiya Universiteti
huzuridagi Diplomatik Akademiya Magistranti*

Abstract: The article analyzes the evolution of the foreign and domestic policies of the United Arab Emirates from the time of the formation of the state to the present. It seems important that the UAE use force tools, which were convincingly demonstrated in the Libyan, Syrian and Yemeni crises. Let us note that before the Arab Spring, the UAE was focused on strengthening its regional position through peaceful diplomacy and reliance on financial resources. Systematic and quantitative methods were used to conduct the research.

Keywords: UAE, Arab Spring, Arab world, Dubai, regional leadership, Abu Dhabi, instability.

INTRODUCTION

In the last decade, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) began to play a prominent role in the system of international relations not only in the Middle East region, but also in the world. For a long time, not standing out among the monarchies of the Persian Gulf, today the UAE influences world processes of a diplomatic, political, economic and technological nature. This is facilitated by competition for regional leadership both between the monarchies of the Persian Gulf in the person of Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and beyond its borders in the person of Egypt, Turkey and Iran.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

The UAE was founded in December 1971 as a federation of 7 emirates (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Fujairah, Sharjah, Umm al-Quwain, Ajman, Ras al-Khaimah). Before the formation of the federation, the emirates were in a rather disunited state under the protectorate of Great Britain. For a long time, the main sources of income were fishing, pearling and nomadic agriculture. However, after at the turn of the 19th–20th centuries. Japan developed a method of artificial cultivation of pearls, the economy of the future monarchies of the Gulf began to experience crisis phenomena. A fundamental change in the situation occurred in the 1950s, when oil and gas reserves were discovered [1]. Subsequently, this led to the gradual diversification of the economy and the development of new sectors of the economy - the development of the tourism industry, construction, business consulting, etc.

It took the UAE about 20 years to overcome tribal differences between the emirates and lay the foundation for economic, political and cultural growth. First of all, it seemed important to create a sense of civic community within the emirates, so that

in the event of any kind of mobilization, the population of the UAE would perceive themselves not as citizens of individual emirates, but as a single people of the UAE. Therefore, the country's leadership was skeptical and wary of any kind of regional-scale projects built on pan-Arab or pan-Islamic platforms.

The key figure in the process of formation of the state was the ruler of the emirate of Abu Dhabi, Zayed bin Sultan al-Nahyan. He was elected president of the UAE and ruled the country until his death on November 2, 2004. He was succeeded in office by his eldest son, Khalifa bin Zayed al-Nahyan. Since Abu Dhabi and Dubai were initially more developed emirates, they became the core of the formation of a united state; the ruler of Dubai is traditionally the prime minister and vice president of the federation [2].

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

In general, since its inception, the UAE has tried to ensure its state security by entering into various types of alliances and collective security agreements. The UAE and other Gulf monarchies created the GCC, in which Saudi Arabia played the role of the locomotive. Abu Dhabi used economic and diplomatic instruments as its main instruments, avoiding forceful solutions to problems.

However, the revolutionary events of the Arab Spring radically changed the configuration of forces in the Middle East and North Africa region. In addition to traditional players such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Iran, new ones have emerged, such as Qatar, the UAE and Turkey. The formation of the Qatari-Turkish alliance, which challenged the growing role of Saudi Arabia in the region (for more details, see: [3]), forced the UAE to side with the Saudis and form a tactical alliance to counter Doha and Ankara.

The rapprochement between the UAE and Saudi Arabia indicates similar positions on a number of issues. Both states oppose the transnational organization "Muslim Brotherhood" and their ideology of moderate Islamism, which contradicts the dominant ideology in the Gulf monarchies – Wahhabism. However, if subsequently Saudi Arabia temporarily softened its attitude towards the Muslim Brotherhood, the UAE continued to oppose any type of Islamism, considering it a source of terrorism and instability [4]. Moreover, the support of the Qatari-Turkish alliance on the Muslim Brotherhood and movements affiliated with them during the Arab Spring significantly strained the relations of the Saudi-Emirati alliance with Doha and Ankara [3]. Among other things, the economic model of Qatar is considered by the UAE as competitive, since Abu Dhabi and Dubai are striving to take the role of one of the centers of world-class economic, information and technological development.

One of the factors stimulating the formation of an independent policy by the Emirates to ensure state security and strengthen its positions was the lack of a firm position of the United States regarding authoritarian regimes in the region. Moreover,

the US withdrawal from Iraq and Baghdad's subsequent move to greater cooperation with Iran forced the UAE to intensify efforts to "contain" Iran's influence and ensure regional stability.

Let us note that in order to carry out full-scale actions aimed at ensuring security and strengthening positions in the region, significant financial resources are required. While there is no doubt about the financial power and potential of Saudi Arabia, the example of the UAE requires a more thorough analysis of the capabilities and reserves of safety of the state.

A significant strengthening of the military-political presence of the UAE took place in the Horn of Africa region. Abu Dhabi, through diplomatic, financial and military levers, put serious pressure on Somalia, Eritrea and Sudan to weaken their interaction with Iran and also begin a joint fight against Islamist forces [3].

The Horn of Africa coast is of strategic importance as it is a link between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, and also provides access to control the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula (in particular Yemen) with the purpose of preventing the Houthis from receiving military support by sea. In December 2016, the UAE signed a renewable 25-year contract to establish an air force base at Berbera on the coast of Somaliland.

The UAE is also a key member of the US-led coalition to "weaken and defeat" ISIS and carried out airstrikes against the group in Syria early in the campaign. By the end of 2015, the UAE was second only to the United States in the number of airstrikes carried out against ISIS targets in Syria [4]. In addition, the UAE has joined Egypt in attempting to promote non-Islamist political forces within the Syrian opposition as an alternative to powerful Islamist and extremist groups.

In support of its regional military role, the UAE has participated in numerous joint military exercise campaigns in recent years. In particular, the UAE armed forces joined in 2016 the joint military exercise Desert Tiger 2 with Malaysia, the joint air exercise Desert Eagle II with India, and the joint military and naval exercise Khalifa II with Egypt.

In addition to the active use of political, security, financial and economic instruments in the struggle for regional leadership, the UAE has demonstrated its mastery of diplomacy techniques. In particular, in 2011, Emirati diplomats actively fought with Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia to provide their territory for negotiations between the Taliban movement and the United States. Competition continued for the right to provide representation for the Taliban.

During the 2017 diplomatic crisis around Qatar, the UAE took the most confrontational position. Even after the crisis, which ended with the signing of a peace agreement in January 2021 between Qatar and the Arab monarchies led by Saudi

Arabia, the UAE was in no hurry to join the agreement and, later than others, began to normalize relations with Doha.

CONCLUSION

Currently, the UAE is a developed state in the Arab world with one of the most open and tolerant societies. The free practice of all religions is guaranteed, and the role of women in the social and political projects of the state is growing. Militarily, the UAE has created a disproportionately powerful and technologically advanced armed force, including an advanced air force and special forces. Added to military power are the enormous capabilities of “soft power”, which the Emirates uses to promote its interests and spread its influence through global assistance, as well as in public diplomacy thanks to its great international authority in areas such as education, science, technology, sports, culture, art. The wave of unrest sweeping the Arab world has weakened the positions of players such as Egypt and Syria, bringing to the fore the Gulf monarchies led by Saudi Arabia. It is important that during the Arab Spring, the UAE already had sufficient military, financial, diplomatic and cultural potential to join the struggle for influence on a regional scale.

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